The Nordic-Baltic region has been important to both Germany and the UK for centuries, vital at various times to either their trading or their security interests or both. It has also been a crucial area for Russia, particularly from the time of Peter the Great, who founded St Petersburg on the Gulf of Finland in 1703 as Russia’s ‘window to Europe’. The region remains an important, and contested, area for both Russia and the West, vital in particular for Europe’s energy security and Russia’s energy exports. Regardless of the outcome of its war against Ukraine, Russia will continue to pay close attention to the region, and to pose a threat to the interests of Germany, the UK and other EU and NATO members there.
After the Cold War, the Baltic region seemed destined for a period of peaceful interactions among its littoral states, with all except Russia members of either the EU, NATO or both. Berlin and London both focused on integrating the new members into the two organisations, while seeking mutually beneficial relations with Russia. All the Baltic littoral countries became members of the Council of Baltic Sea States, an organisation set up in 1992 to promote regional co-operation on issues including environmental protection, humanitarian questions, education and infrastructure. In the wider Nordic region, Finland, Norway and Sweden all sought to improve relations with Russia and to profit from commercial opportunities.
Tension between Russia and the West grew, however, particularly after the 2014 annexation of Crimea; and the security situation in the Nordic-Baltic region changed fundamentally after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. There is renewed East-West confrontation throughout the area, where Russia shares borders with six NATO allies (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Poland).
After Finland and Sweden joined NATO in 2023 and 2024 respectively, it is not surprising that some commentators described the Baltic Sea as a “NATO lake”; of the littoral states, only Russia is now a non-NATO (and non-EU) country.1 That ignores the fact, however, that the Baltic Sea is an international waterway, with extensive sub-sea energy and communications infrastructure that is hard to protect against covert attacks; and that Russia still has important interests in the Nordic-Baltic region.
This policy brief assesses the roles that the UK and Germany see themselves as playing in the Nordic-Baltic region and existing co-operation between them, including in the framework of NATO. The assessment is embedded in the broader context of Western and Russian interests in the Nordic-Baltic region, and current security challenges, with a particular focus on the Baltic Sea and the littoral states. Finally, the piece offers recommendations on areas for additional UK-Germany consultation and co-ordination.
About the author:
Ian Bond is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform.