Far-right forces emerged strengthened following the 2024 European Parliament elections. Nonetheless, they still remain divided within the legislative body. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) made moderate gains and is now joined by the Patriots for Europe (PfE) and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) groups. Although the alliance of France’s National Rally and Hungary’s Fidesz has made the PfE the third-largest group in the Parliament, its direct influence is likely to remain limited. After all, the core interest of the PfE and its members is more focused on funding, publicity and national arenas. The biggest prize, however, is influence in the Council and European Council, where the PfE hopes to gain more direct say via national governments. This could have a lasting impact on European politics, however, it is less likely to affect members of the EP.
One of the issues that dominated the run-up to the 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections – as in 2019 and 2014 – was the expected political rise of the right. However, the election results were more nuanced, resulting in new avenues of influence of these parties on European politics and policy-making both within the European Parliament and the wider institutional setup of the EU.
Three developments are of particular note here: First, far-right parties made the most significant gains in the EU’s founding states. In France, the National Rally (NR) won most of the country’s seats in the EP; in Germany, Alternative for Germany (AfD) won almost 16 per cent of the vote (compared to 11 per cent in 2019); in Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy more than quadrupled its share of the vote to 28.8 per cent (after 6.44 per cent in 2019), although its coalition partner, the more right-wing Lega, suffered major losses. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) won 17 per cent. Other notable gains were made by the Bulgarian Revival party and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which won the most votes in the Austrian EP elections. Because Germany, France and Italy, as the most populous EU states, have the most seats in the EP, the gains made by these parties are particularly significant.
The second notable development arising from the 2024 EP elections is the more nuanced picture that arises when looking at the EU as a whole. In Finland, Sweden, and Hungary, far-right parties lost support compared to 2019. In many Central and Eastern European countries, including Czechia, Estonia and Poland, 2024 gains were also limited. A comparison of the 2019 and 2024 EP election results shows, above all, that the most significant gains for the far-right parties already occurred in 2019.
The third development arising from the 2024 EP elections is the qualitative difference in public discussions, as, for the first time, the centre-right openly discussed under what conditions it should cooperate with far-right parties. The European People’s Party (EPP) defined three criteria for cooperation with (parts of) the national conservative European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), namely, they must be pro-EU, pro-Ukraine and pro-rule of law. These criteria were primarily directed at exploring cooperation with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party, but excluded parties that were further to the right. In contrast, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the liberal Renew Europe group, and the Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA) all rejected cooperation with all right-wing parties, including the ECR. Furthermore, these three political groups also made it clear that they would not cooperate with the EPP if it was to collaborate with far-right parties, starting with the election of the European Commission President. After relatively short negotiations, Ursula von der Leyen was able to build a majority to be re-elected as Commission President with the support of the EPP, S&D, ALDE and the Greens-EFA, thus not requiring the backing of Meloni or the ECR.
Fluid political groups of the European Parliament
The composition of the EP and its majorities also depends on how national members of the European Parliament (MEPs) organise themselves into political groups. The elected representatives usually agree on the formation of these groups prior to the EP’s inaugural session as important positions in the Parliament, such as committee chairs, heads of delegations and the President of the Parliament, are allocated according to the size of the respective groups. However, MEPs can switch between groups at any time, and they do so much more frequently than at the national level.
This phenomenon is exemplified in the most recent 2019–2024 Parliament: The EPP, the largest and most well-organised group, gained 12 new MEPs during the last legislative period, seven of whom previously belonged to one of the far-right groups. It also lost 19 MEPs, 11 of whom pre-emptively left the EPP because their Fidesz party was expected to be expelled from the group in March 2021. In contrast, the liberal Renew Europe group can be seen as a catch-all actor, having absorbed a total of ten MEPs from four different groups (the ECR, EPP, Greens-EFA and S&D) over the course of the 2019–2024 period. Nevertheless, the centre-left and centre-right groups have now existed in their current forms for several parliamentary terms (see SWP-Studie 9/2019).
The most significant shifts have been and continue to be in the fragmented spectrum to the right of the EPP. In the 2019–2024 period, the far-right populist Identity and Democracy (ID) group stood further to the right of the ECR. Even before the 2024 European elections, however, it was clear that there would be major shakeups in the 2024–2029 period. In response to several scandals involving the AfD’s lead candidate, Maximilian Krah, the party was expelled from the ID group at the behest of NR President Marine Le Pen. At the same time, Viktor Orbán, whose Fidesz party has been unaligned since 2021, publicly sought to join either the ECR or ID; in Orbán’s view, the best-case scenario would be to merge these two groups, along with his Fidesz.
About the Authors
Max Becker EU/Europe Research Assistant at SWP.
Dr. Nicolai von Ondarza since 2010 at SWP, since 2020 Head of EU/Europe Research Division, 2016–2020 Deputy Head.