In the aftermath of Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine, what had been a long-dormant EU accession process has been revived. Since 2022, the European Council has granted candidate status to Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia. Today, there are nine candidate countries to access the EU: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine. Kosovo has also applied to become a candidate. Negotiations have already started and accelerated with several of them, whereas Georgia has since frozen its accession application. Türkiye’s accession bid has long stalled, so it is not considered for the purpose of this analysis.
The prospect of a large wave of EU enlargement by 2030 or even 2035 might be optimistic. But the path towards enlargement is set, and today’s geopolitical context appears to be more favourable to it than five years ago. Some European leaders are advocating for a fast accession process, like French President Emmanuel Macron. But some member-states are still reticent in private, particularly because they think a larger Union would require substantial reforms of voting rules and institutions to function better and avoid political deadlock. This ambivalence is due to the need to balance two forces: the threats posed by a more aggressive Russia and America’s retrenchment make enlargement more urgent, while ensuring effective decision-making in an EU with potentially more than thirty member-states requires institutional reforms (including to avoid post-accession backsliding in the rule-of-law) – and reforms take time.
Enlargement, be it fast or slow, will affect all areas of EU policy-making. This insight focuses on the implications for the EU budget, including EU financial support to facilitate the achievement of climate targets and the decarbonisation of the EU energy system.
About the Author
Elisabetta Cornago is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.