While Trump and J.D. Vance’s talk of ending US support for Ukraine has set off alarms in European capitals, a Harris administration’s Ukraine strategy probably would depart from the status quo, too. As the war grinds on, US officials have lost confidence that Ukraine will capture and hold enough ground to break the current deadlock. Despite the Ukrainians’ offensive into Russia’s Kursk region, they are still losing ground in Donetsk. Recovering the territory they have lost since February 2022 becomes more unlikely by the day.
Thus, a Harris administration would have to look for ways to strengthen Ukraine’s hand in the short term in order to pivot toward a settlement. Knowing better than anyone that their situation is bleak, the Ukrainians have been looking for a way out of the stalemate. Though they have launched their Kursk gambit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in July that he wants the “hot stage” of the war to end this year. Privately, Ukrainian leaders may be hoping that the United States will push them to the negotiating table, as that would provide the political cover they need to change course. Such discussions are already well underway in Washington.
This might come as a shock to those Europeans (including the next high representative for foreign affairs) who still talk about supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes,” and whose rhetoric has hardly changed since February 24, 2022. Whatever happens, the challenge for Europeans is to ensure that the war does not result in a “peace” on Russian terms: a demilitarized Ukraine that is forced to abandon its aspirations to join NATO and the European Union.
But, again, there is no reason to expect that Harris would have a significantly softer China policy than Biden (whose approach has been much tougher than Trump’s was while in office). The anti-China consensus in the US is solid, and in her few public statements on the matter, Harris has voiced strong support for Taiwan and complained about China dumping “substandard products into our economy.” While her running mate, Tim Walz, has visited China many times, he has done so largely as an advocate of human rights.
Unlike Trump, Harris has been vocal in her support for America’s network of alliances. But this commitment might make her expect more from US allies. Moreover, since she is no dyed-in-the-wool Atlanticist like Biden, the broader trend of US foreign policy shifting away from Europe and toward Asia would persist. When Europeans talk about investing more in defense, they should ask themselves whether they are merely trying to placate Trump, or whether they are genuinely serious about providing for their own long-term security.
Much of the task of envisioning what a Trump or a Harris presidency would mean for Europe will fall on the new European Commission, which will have to start preparing Europeans so that they do not panic if their biggest fears regarding Ukraine or China are realized. Failure to do so will increase the likelihood of a disjointed response, with smaller member states possibly peeling off to pursue bilateral deals with the US. It will be up to the bigger countries to calm their smaller counterparts (many of them in eastern Europe).
To that end, recasting relations with the United Kingdom could be a game-changer. If the EU and the UK can work in lockstep on geoeconomic issues, they will have more policy leeway and clout vis-à-vis the US and China. Although Britain cannot replace the US, its reintegration into European defense and technology frameworks could significantly bolster the continent’s strategic position. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s new government has already embarked on an enhanced security and defense partnership with Germany, and similar deals with likeminded members could follow, culminating in a pact with the EU as a whole.
About the author:
Mark Leonard, Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of The Age of Unpeace: How Connectivity Causes Conflict (Bantam Press, 2021).