The post-cold war era in world history is over. War has returned to Europe, the United States faces unprecedented challenges as a global power, and the rules-based international order is crumbling. Yet a new order is not yet discernible. We live in a dangerous interregnum. The outcome of the US presidential election on 5 November will influence how much time Europe has left to adjust to these changes. But its need to do so is already certain.
Vladimir Putin never accepted the outcome of the cold war, particularly the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of central and eastern European states. His goal is the re-establishment of a Russian empire in Europe. For him, Ukraine is just the beginning, not the end. While Russia’s revisionism targets European order, China’s ambition is to challenge global rules and institutions shaped by the US and Europe after 1945. Today, as an economic and military power, Beijing seeks to reshape this order according to its own interests. But troublingly, it seeks to achieve these changes not through reforms but through violations of international law and military threats, most notably in the Indo-Pacific.
The US is increasingly coming under pressure. It is stretched to its limits, both politically and financially. Through its war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia has forced the US to become heavily involved in European security once again. Meanwhile, China’s military posturing towards Taiwan is intensifying in the Pacific. And war has returned to the Middle East, sparked by Hamas’s terror against Israel, threatening to ignite a new regional conflagration.
However, it is not only global challenges that confront and overwhelm the US. The country is also threatened from within by a bitter polarisation that shakes the very foundations of its democracy.
These new domestic and foreign policy challenges have fundamentally altered the US political self-image. The conviction that European security is in America’s interest, and a key pillar of its global influence, is eroding across broad segments of US politics and society. Staunch transatlanticists like Joe Biden have become rarer. Many Americans are no longer willing to pay for European security. Many politicians, led by Donald Trump, have recognised this and are capitalising on it.
This development is perilous for Europe. It is in Germany’s and the European Union’s own vital strategic interests to ensure the continuation of US political and military engagement in our continent. Only in this way can the West preserve itself as a normative and geopolitical actor throughout this period and re-anchor itself in the emerging new order.
Germans and Europeans must do much more. The transatlantic community can only endure if both sides share the burden fairly. There is no way around this, regardless of who wins the US election. Yet the outcome will be decisive in determining how much time and room for manoeuvre Europeans will have.
The exact consequences of Trump’s re-election are unpredictable. Nonetheless, it is clear that a second Trump term would lead to an unprecedented rupture in transatlantic relations. Since his first election victory, political tensions within the US and his personal grievances have intensified considerably. In a second term, he would be better prepared and more aggressive in implementing his goals. Europeans would have to anticipate a departure from previous US foreign policy.
In no area would this rupture be more radical than in support for Ukraine. Trump has made it clear where he stands. He would immediately cut financial and military aid and, in the worst-case scenario, negotiate a punishing peace deal with Russia over Ukraine’s head. Europeans must take this danger seriously.
It would be the harshest shock the transatlantic relationship has ever experienced. The EU would suddenly be forced to organise its own security and that of Ukraine. Simultaneously, such a deal between Trump and Putin would fundamentally weaken NATO. Trust in the alliance would be shattered.
A Kamala Harris win would not bring such a shock in transatlantic relations. But it would still be no cause for complacency among Europeans. Even Harris would likely continue the long-standing trend in US foreign policy, interrupted only by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, of reducing US engagement in Europe and focusing more on the threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific. She would also be under pressure to cut the funds previously earmarked for European security to address domestic challenges instead.
For both Democrats and Republicans, containing China is the undisputed foreign-policy priority. They expect their allies to stand firmly by their side in this endeavour. However, so far, the German government has sought to avoid too close an alignment. To this day, Germany has pursued a special path with Chinese manufacturers in its 5G expansion. The government pays only lip service to the concept of ‘de-risking’ from China. Germany’s refusal to support European tariffs on state-subsidised Chinese electric vehicles is just the latest in a long line of regrettable examples. Regardless of whether Harris or Trump wins, the US will increase pressure on Germany and the EU to align more closely in the competition with China. Should they continue to resist, it will place a lasting strain on transatlantic relations.
In the Near and Middle East, the longstanding US withdrawal will continue under either candidate. The country’s current heightened diplomatic and military presence in the region will not be sustained. At the same time, China’s influence there is steadily growing. This presents Europeans with a new challenge. The EU and German diplomatic influence there is minimal. A convincing strategy to upgrade it is still lacking.
Europeans must prepare. They must be the primary organisers of the continent’s security. They must not adopt the defeatism propagated by Olaf Scholz, who claims that Ukraine would be lost without US support. If the US ceases its support for Ukraine, the EU must step up. Anything less would be a capitulation to Russian imperialism.
If Europeans are unwilling to do more, it will hurt Europe twice over. Firstly, it will make the continent vulnerable to aggressors like Russia, which will be undeterred. Secondly, it will undermine transatlantic relations. Already today, many in the US view us Europeans as freeloaders, leaving Americans to bear the costs of European security. To counter this argument, the EU must invest in its military capabilities.
Here, Germany can and must play a central role. The states between Germany and Russia, which suffered the worst atrocities under Nazi rule, are now urging Berlin to take responsibility for European security in cooperation with them. No other country in Europe has the ability to provide the leadership that Germany’s location, economic strength, and political stability offer.
The German government, however, seems unbothered by this. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should have made clear what is needed. It would have been Germany’s historic task to launch a fast European initiative to support Ukraine, bringing together eastern and western Europe in this process. It would have been the opportunity to create European momentum and establish Europe as an actor capable of supplying its own security. It would have provided a safeguard against a potential US withdrawal and would simultaneously have served as a clear signal that Europeans understand and accept their demands for burden-sharing, thereby making such a withdrawal less likely.
Instead of boldly embracing the new reality, the German government remains in a state of waiting. This reflects a repetition of the same pattern observed in previous crises: a continuation of business as usual. It is not that these challenges are difficult to see; rather, there is a lack of will and courage to accept the consequences.
Much is at stake in the upcoming US elections. For the US, its democracy. For Europe, the future of its security. But the continent’s dependence and inability to adapt is a European failure, not an American one. Those in Europe must now shed their complacency and strain every sinew to become resilient in the defence of their democracy, freedom, and security. Only then will Europeans, as transatlantic allies, be able to navigate this geopolitical interregnum successfully.
About the Author
Norbert Röttgen has been a member of the German parliament since 1994 and chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag from 2014 to 2021. Previously, he served as German federal minister for the environment, nature conservation, and nuclear safety, as well as spokesperson for legal policy and parliamentary secretary of the Christian Democratic Party’s parliamentary group. He is vice-chair of the board of directors of the transatlantic association Atlantik-Brücke and a member of the Advisory Council at the German Council on Foreign Relations.