Summary
- In the movie “Barbie” the titular character comes to realise that Barbieland is not the utopia she assumed it to be.
- Similarly, European political leaders have blind spots that illustrate the difference between the principle and the reality of the EU’s Enlightenment ideals. In time, these could come to undermine the health of democracy inside the bloc.
- This year’s European Parliament election and the aftermath of the war in Gaza exposed the ‘under-participation’ in Europe of groups such as non-white and Muslim Europeans, central and eastern Europeans, and young EU citizens.
- At the same time, developments concerning each of these groups pointed to one joint challenge – which is about the bloc’s dangerous xenophobic drift.
- Pro-Europeans should urgently acknowledge these blind spots, give voice to underrepresented groups, and reverse the drift towards an ‘ethnic’ conception of Europeanness by reconstructing a ‘civic’ offer that upholds the foundational values of the EU.
Welcome to Barbieland
Today’s European Union resembles a Barbieland: a place prone to regard itself as more perfect than it really is – and harbouring some notable blind spots.
In Greta Gerwig’s 2023 film, the eponymous character leaves the fantastical Barbieland and finds her way to the real world. Much to her consternation, Barbie discovers not all girls are eternally grateful to her for empowering and emancipating them. Worse, many see her as a source of suffering and oppression.
In the past 12 months, many people who consider themselves “pro-European” might have experienced the equivalent of Barbie’s shock. Within Europe, not everyone is in love with the EU – but, worse, many are visibly disillusioned with the European project, some are simply uninterested, while others see themselves as outsiders to the EU community.
This paper considers the experience of three specific groups: non-white and Muslim Europeans; people in central and eastern Europe; and Europe’s youngest citizens. Over the past year, all three groups have ‘under-participated’ in Europe, though for different reasons.
Other sections of European society might have equal claim to such analysis – this paper is inevitably a ‘director’s cut’. Yet what binds these three groups is the challenge they pose to the EU – whose cherished ideals might expect enthusiastic participation and support from Europeans who should be benefitting from the bloc’s free, open, and equal space. But signs exist that not all are happy. The EU risks leaving several blind spots unattended, until such time that sudden events bring these areas of inattention inescapably to the fore.
But consideration of these three groups together is also warranted by their connection to one joint challenge – which concerns the bloc’s drift towards an ‘ethnic’, rather than a ‘civic’, understanding of Europeanness.
This is not to say the bloc is in imminent danger or even that most Europeans have turned their backs on the EU. “European sentiment” – the sense of belonging to a common space, sharing a common future, and subscribing to common values, which is best observed against the background of major shocks and events – remains strong across most of the EU.
The paper opens with an assessment of the state of European sentiment in 2024. It then examines three ‘blind spots’ the EU must attend to, reflecting on the extent to which they have been exposed by two major events of the past year: the war in Gaza and the European Parliament election. It examines the relationship between these ‘blind spots’ and the risk of xenophobic drift in the EU. And it recommends three key actions for pro-Europeans: firstly, to open up workable channels of participation in Europe for all EU inhabitants, especially those who may currently feel voiceless; secondly, to resist the temptation to adopt an ‘ethnic’ conception of Europeanness, whether for electoral or strategic reasons; and thirdly, to fill the ‘civic’ conception of Europeanness with content to offer a tangible and attractive alternative.
This is the third edition of the annual European Sentiment Compass, which is a joint initiative by ECFR and the European Cultural Foundation. It is largely based on research conducted by ECFR’s 27 associate researchers in summer 2024.
About the author:
Pawel Zerka is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.