Hungary took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 July. Zsuzsanna Végh and Sonja Priebus assess what the presidency might mean for the EU.
On 1 July, Hungary took over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time since its accession to the EU 20 years ago. Its first run in 2011 under the then-relatively new government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was already not without conflicts as the first signs of democratic backsliding appeared in the country. Still, the presidency itself was conducted in a professional manner.
Thirteen years later and with several anti-EU billboard campaigns under its belt, the Orbán-government now takes the helm of the Council as the EU’s first electoral autocracy and with a reputation as the most contentious EU member state. Concerns are running high as to whether Hungary will act as an honest broker in advancing the EU’s agenda.
With a summer break in sight and the institutional transition dominating the autumn, however, its room to influence policymaking will be limited. The Hungarian presidency will be unable to paralyse the EU, but the tangible insecurities about its prospective behaviour highlight the severe consequences that Euroscepticism and the internal authoritarian challenge pose to the EU as a club of democracies.
The road to the EU presidency
In the period leading up to the presidency, the Hungarian government’s authoritarian track record sparked a debate over whether Hungary is suited to taking on the role. Experts explored the possibility of suspending or postponing the country’s presidency, while the European Parliament adopted a five-party resolution expressing doubts that Hungary could credibly fulfil its tasks in the spirit of sincere cooperation and asked the Council to strip Hungary of its right to hold the presidency. With a few exceptions like Germany, however, member states showed no political will to pursue this initiative and Hungary remained part of the originally planned presidential trio with Spain and Belgium.
Preparation on the Hungarian side entered full swing with a government reshuffle in 2023: then-justice minister Judit Varga, who also oversaw EU affairs, resigned to lead Fidesz’s European parliamentary election list and campaign. János Bóka, her former state secretary and an experienced EU expert, was nominated to lead a newly established ministry for EU affairs. Detaching it from the justice ministry, which had a conflict-ridden relationship with EU institutions over rule-of-law issues, served to detoxify the EU portfolio and create a professional image rooted in expertise and experience in the run-up to the presidency.
With presidency preparations decoupled from one of its most popular politicians, the governing party could have expected a smooth European Parliament election campaign with Varga in the lead. However, an unexpected scandal over a presidential pardon Varga had countersigned led not only to her abrupt withdrawal from politics in early 2024 but also to the sudden rise of a new political force – led by her ex-husband Péter Magyar – that quickly became Orbán’s main challenger.
Though Fidesz won on 9 June with 44.8 per cent of the vote, it did so with its worst-ever result in a European Parliament election, despite the prime minister’s calls to “occupy Brussels”. The domestic challenge was followed by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s rejection of Fidesz as a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists group, leaving Orbán’s party in search of potentially new, more regional political alternatives.
Priorities and realities of the EU presidency
Though the road to Hungary’s EU presidency faced more obstacles than the government may have anticipated, its presidency motto set no lesser an aim than to “Make Europe Great Again!”, which is a clear nod to former US President Donald Trump’s famous MAGA slogan. Orbán is a staunch admirer of Trump and holds high hopes for his return to the White House in this year’s US presidential election.
At the same time, the presidency motto is also a thinly veiled criticism of the outgoing European Commission and the European political mainstream. In Orbán’s view, their policies have been a complete failure, seriously weakening the European Union and perpetuating its multiple crises.
Consequently, the priorities of the presidency programme claim to provide “real solutions to Europe’s real problems” and seek to address a multitude of issues, such as European competitiveness, defence, enlargement, migration, cohesion and agricultural policies, and demographic challenges – several of which also correspond to the issues on which the Hungarian government has often formulated vocal criticism.
Yet, despite this ambitious agenda, the Hungarian presidency’s policy impact will be constrained due to the institutional transition following the June European Parliament elections. It will not be before late autumn that the parliamentary hearings of the new commissioner nominees designated by the member states will be completed and the new European Commission can commence its work. By the time all new institutions are fully operational, only a few weeks will be left to proceed with legislative work.
Moreover, while the presidency prepares and chairs the various Council formations and sets the agenda for the meetings, the Foreign Affairs Council is chaired by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The fact that Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó, known for his close ties with Moscow, is not going to chair these meetings means the Hungarian presidency has less room to influence the foreign policy agenda.
Worries were nonetheless apparent even in the last push of the outgoing Belgian presidency and the EU institutions to launch accession talks with Moldova and Ukraine before the start of the Hungarian presidency. Yet, in foreign policy, it is Hungary’s often obstructionist stance related to support for Ukraine, and a tougher stance toward Russia and China that poses obstacles. The presidency highlights this challenge.
With little room for policy work, the Hungarian presidency is expected to be a highly political one. The Orbán-government will undoubtedly make the most of the opportunity to promote its hard Eurosceptic agenda and will use the platform of the presidency to build political and intellectual alliances in favour of its vision of Europe.
In Orbán’s vision, the European Union should be reduced to an intergovernmental organisation, where sovereignty remains exclusively with the member states. Direct elections to the European Parliament should be abolished and its members should be delegated by the national legislatures instead. In addition, the European Commission should be obliged to maintain political and ideological neutrality via the treaties. Though such reforms will naturally not be implemented within six months, if advocated for by the government in charge of the EU’s rotating presidency, such calls may weaken the Union’s credibility as a strong and united actor.
It is unlikely that the Hungarian government will give up its confrontational stance during the presidency. On the contrary, we can expect further radicalisation as Eurosceptic and illiberal forces gain ground in the EU. With the imminent possibility of such parties entering national governments in countries like Austria, Czechia, or even France, calls for radical reforms of the EU may become louder and Orbán’s government may feel empowered.
Although Eurosceptic governments have already been at the helm of the rotating presidency in the past, the fact that this time the presidency is filled by the government of the EU’s first non-democratic member state lends the discussion about the future of the EU a new dimension.