The United States and its “nuclear umbrella” have been central to the European security order since the aftermath of the Second World War, when the British and French succeeded in obtaining a security commitment which was crystalised in the North Atlantic Treaty.
Fears of the global spread of communism at the time reinforced America’s belief that its own security was dependent upon precluding the communist take-over of Europe and reinforced a solid consensus at the domestic level in favour of a US presence in Europe. If the end of the Cold War stoked fears – largely unfounded – of European abandonment, the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine did much to reinforce the centrality of America to Europe’s security order.
Under Joe Biden, the US was the single largest provider of economic and military aid to the Kyiv government, and the US was steadfast in its opposition to any ceding of Ukrainian territory to Russia. While Ukraine is not a NATO member, much of the western response to the conflict has been coordinated through the Alliance’s Ukraine Defense Contact Group.
The return of Trump
In his first term, Trump made no secret of his willingness to withdraw the US from NATO if the Europeans failed to pay their way, nor of his sympathy for President Putin and his desire to negotiate face-to-face with leaders to negotiate peaceful outcomes. Trump’s re-election after a campaign in which he pledged to end the war “on day one” through a negotiated settlement and continued to decry the US commitment to NATO has placed in doubt the sustainability of the western response to the war.
While these two talking points are mixed up in Trump’s rhetoric, they point in very different directions. Concern with burden sharing implies that NATO needs reform, not abolition, and the threat of US withdrawal – while justified instrumentally – would undermine the entire system of European defence. The desire for a negotiated outcome in Ukraine does not imply changes to NATO itself, but rather a different strategic line, one that is at odds with the thinking in European capitals.
Adding to Kyiv’s concerns, Trump’s election comes at a time when Europeans are increasingly fatigued with the costs of supporting Ukraine, with growing politicisation of the topic in European countries, pushed increasingly by far-right and far-left populist movements. Europe cannot afford to lose the American financial and military commitment to Ukraine, nor the diplomatic and strategic heft of the US as a major player in bringing the conflict to an end. If Trump departs from the current consensus, the lynchpin of the western (and European) coalition supporting Kyiv is lost.
Yet the European countries fear what could happen if Kyiv is left under supported, both for the people of Ukraine and their right to live in a state free from external interference, and for European security as a whole. Many countries see Russia’s actions as an existential threat to European values and a key moment – like the Munich Agreement – where faltering will embolden Moscow’s demands.
Will Trump actually do it?
If Trump’s first tenure in office taught analysts one thing, it is that he is absolutely prepared to follow through with policies regarded either as damaging or empty rhetoric by many. But Trump is also capricious and liable to change his mind on a whim – and when official policy is to end support for Kyiv, observers may be hoping for greater unpredictability.
Trump will be largely unconstrained domestically owing to the scale of his victory and his cult-like grip on his supporters. But what this means in practice is complicated. It might make it more likely Trump will push Kyiv into accepting a poor outcome, since this could be packaged as a “quick win” back home. But unconditional support back home also gives him more freedom to renege on commitments if the “price” is not right.
Moreover, in any negotiated outcome, there will be lots of issues on the table, including the borders of the Ukrainian state, future NATO or EU membership, continuity in government and reparations for war damage. Outcomes for a negotiated settlement would be more favourable to the extent that Russia believes the alternative is a western victory. Trump may come to appreciate – and his advisors are lobbying thusly – that “peace through strength” is the best way to reach a favourable agreement.
European leaders can also be expected to lobby Trump not to sell out Ukraine. In the UK, as in other capitals, this is the number one message being prepared for the incoming administration, and this may succeed in highlighting the trade-offs involved in Trump’s rash promises.
If the Trump administration is not receptive, then Europeans may well decide to take matters into their own hands and seek further strategic integration through the EU or a European variant of NATO. This creates its own form of pressure, too, since – burden sharing concerns aside – the US has historically appreciated aspects of the European dependence on America for security, and the weapons sales and political deference which result.
What will be the impact on Europe?
Any cut in US military aid to Kyiv would present major financial challenges for the European states in the coalition seeking to maintain support for Ukraine. Should Trump disengage the US from NATO, Europeans would find themselves on the line for significant increases in defence expenditures to modernise their nuclear and conventional forces. Whether Europeans would be willing to pay the increased costs of defending Kyiv depends on a host of factors, including what effect Trump’s election has on the balance of support within Europe.
On the one hand, Trump’s election may bring about despondency within Europe. Public opinion has already been turning against the war in some quarters, and losing American support (and money) would make the policy not only more costly but potentially also less likely to be successful.
Thus, his election might reinforce existing scepticism towards the costs of the war, which is increasing in some quarters. It may also give succour to populist movements (and governments) who have become increasingly critical of the broader European line in recent years, providing them with an opportunity to push for a negotiated settlement or defect from the European strategy.
On the other hand, Trump’s election might have a more galvanising effect by raising the stakes of the conflict and placing greater responsibility on European countries to maintain their own security. There is historical precedent here as European security integration has peaked at previous moments of transatlantic divergence, while Trump’s last presidency fed increasing support among European publics for greater “strategic autonomy”.
High levels of politicisation in the US and the increasing risk of a Trump presidency has, in recent years, reinforced a sense that Europeans need to do more on their own, and this has buttressed the EU’s growing role as a security actor. Trump’s election ends the indeterminacy of “hedging” and makes real these imminent concerns. It might also be politically beneficial in some constituencies that the narrative shifts towards European interests and value, lessening the image that this is Washington’s war.
Trump’s election might also call the bluff of populist leaders. While Trump has his admirers on the other side of the Atlantic, the strategic situation in Europe is very different. Trump is supporting an isolationist US, while European populists would be abrogating their own security. While populist leaders often see strategic issues differently, in many instances their opposition to the European war effort has borne clear signs of instrumentality and short-term electoral concerns.
The future
Predicting Trump’s future behaviour would be a fool’s errand. But we know enough about his views on Ukraine and NATO to know that major challenges are in store for the coalition supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia. For Europeans, their bluff has been called on whether they are willing to spend what it takes to guarantee their own security and whether they are willing to fight on behalf of others.
Politics will not stay out of this. We can expect serious negotiations both within and between European countries regarding the best way forward, as well as concerted efforts to lobby the new US government to try to reach a compromise outcome that avoids capitulation to Moscow.
About the author:
Benjamin Martill is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh.