In the coming months, the European Commission is set to unveil its proposal for the next long-term EU budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2028-2034. In it, the Commission should define its strategic vision and tools for addressing global challenges in fragile settings. Waiting until next year to clarify this direction will be too late. The EU must set its ambition now, or risk being overshadowed by short-term, interest-driven agendas.
At the start of the new European Commission’s term, two commissioners – Jozef Síkela (international partnerships) and Hadja Lahbib (preparedness and crisis management, and equality) – were asked to build on the October 2024 Niinistö Report on how the EU should strengthen ‘mutual resilience’ and respond to fragility. Yet, throughout 2024, a series of events, commentaries and studies highlighted growing concerns about the extent to which the new European Commission would truly prioritise fragility.
We found ample references to the importance of supporting fragile contexts in Síkela and Lahbib’s mission letters as well as their written answers to the European Parliament’s questions ahead of their confirmation hearings. Síkela also reiterated this during this week’s Structured Dialogue on the Commission Work Programme with the European Parliament’s Committee on Development. However, one key question remains unanswered: who should lead the promotion and implementation – beyond formulation – of the planned “Commission-wide integrated approach to fragility”, requested in Lahbib’s mission letter.
This ambiguity was confirmed in early 2025 when the European Commission decided to deprioritise the formulation of the integrated approach to fragility and defer it to 2026. It leaves the EU’s future support for fragility in a vacuum, both for the remainder of the current MFF and the MFF for the 2028-2034 period.
Political leadership over the EU’s response to fragility seems adrift
This deprioritisation is in line with shifts in EU external action priorities – as reflected in a recent think tank analysis of the Commission’s spending on fragility during the current MFF. Commitments for peace, security and governance decreased on average by 60% when comparing the figures for the 2021-2024 with those of 2025-2027. This spending contrasts with the number of armed conflicts, which is currently at its highest since the end of the Cold War. Violent conflict is also concentrated in highly fragile contexts, including Sudan, the Great Lakes Region, the Sahel, the wider West African region and Myanmar – and with South Sudan on the brink of renewed civil war.
A clearly articulated ‘commission-wide’ integrated approach to fragility will be crucial in the ongoing discussions on the next MFF and should ideally be reflected in the Commission’s proposal for future instruments and allocated amounts, expected in July 2025. But while the Commission typically formulates a strategy for dedicated policy domains, this approach does not apply to the EU’s support to fragility.
At the moment, the Commission’s responsibilities and tools towards supporting humanitarian, development and peacebuilding needs are spread across its directorate-generals for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), International Partnerships (DG INTPA), its Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). We also note this in a forthcoming ECDPM brief on the EU’s neighbourhood, development and international cooperation instrument (NDICI-Global Europe). The institutional fragmentation and the increasingly apparent lack of strategic orientation lead to a ‘muddling through’ approach, where each service is trying to make the best out of an imperfect situation.
In a public hearing in the European Parliament, commissioner Síkela highlighted that 36 out of 61 fragile contexts identified in the 2025 OECD States of Fragility report benefit from Global Gateway investments. He also noted that certain countries might not be ready for the Global Gateway yet and suggested – in our reading – that the 360-degree approach provides a valid and sufficient response to various dimensions of fragility for the remaining countries.
Practitioners inside DG INTPA contest this and note that a shared understanding and concept of how to support (highly) fragile countries does not exist. DG ECHO funds the EU’s humanitarian support and, since the start of the new Commission’s term, has been given an enhanced role in the EU’s preparedness to prevent and react to emerging threats and crises, while FPI continues to focus on smaller interventions for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and rapid responses.
This fragmentation is deepening further with the termination of several EU trust funds, including the Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa (2015-2025). According to evaluations of EU instruments, EUTF resilience support to the Horn of Africa and the EU’s support to fragile contexts these provided a platform for bringing together different services for decision-making around the EU’s humanitarian, development and peacebuilding support at field level.
What does this mean for responding to fragility in the next MFF?
Those dealing with fragility are aware that the Commission might allocate considerably less funding to fragile contexts in the next MFF. Yet, the European Commission simply cannot afford to neglect the more or less 60 countries with multidimensional fragility challenges – countries that are also potential strategic partners in geopolitically important regions or home to critical raw materials – in strategic discussions on the EU’s future external action, noting that the Global Gateway is not a strategy in response to fragility. Reduced funding will also undermine the EU’s ability to respond to rising global levels of fragility, which is particularly troubling amid the US’ complete withdrawal from the international cooperation system following the dramatic overhaul of USAID.
Discussions now revolve around further consolidating existing instruments, combining NDICI-Global Europe and the pre-accession assistance (IPA) and humanitarian assistance (HUMA) instruments under one mega-instrument for external action. The need to set up dedicated provisions in support of fragile contexts has not been considered so far. This reform would give the EU’s leadership the flexibility to shift funds to respond more easily to unforeseen crises and changing priorities.
Under the current NDICI-Global Europe, the ‘merging challenges and priorities cushion’ allowed the EU to address unforeseen challenges between 2021 and 2023. This – comparatively limited – amount was largely depleted for the EU’s support to Ukraine, COVID-19 response and Syrian refugee support, reducing resources for unforeseen events in other parts of the world and leaving minimal flexibility for emergencies until 2027.
Making the case for fragility
In the past months, the Egmont Institute and the Norwegian Refugee Council coordinated several informal exchanges with senior EU officials and independent experts, including from ECDPM, to draft ideas on the formulation of the integrated approach to fragility, expected in 2026. These will be also useful for the ongoing MFF discussions.
Key issues include the need for dedicated – and hence predictable – funds for fragile contexts, the creation of multi-year flexible envelopes and/or country-based pooled funds to respond to fragility, and placing decision-making responsibilities for these funds at EU delegations at country and regional levels. Additionally, it is crucial to preserve knowledge and expertise from current EU staff on how to engage with fragile and complex contexts in specific countries and regions.
The European Commission should also ensure that its engagement in fragile and complex contexts is driven by the needs of its partners and local realities – building on the EU’s technical experience – rather than focusing only on its interests and geopolitical positioning. Only then can it make its external engagements a success, including those related to Global Gateway investments.
A convincing political narrative should support such a dedicated approach. This narrative should outline the EU’s strategic direction for future external action priorities, make a strong case for engagement in fragile settings, consider the risks of inaction, and position the EU as a reliable partner for global economic and political stability.
About the Authors
Volker Hauck is a senior executive at ECDPM.
Sophie Desmidt is the associate director of ECDPM’s peaceful societies and accountable governance cluster and Head of the Peace, security and resilience workstream. She is also a member of the management team.